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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISPS CODE  
NON-CONFORMITIES FROM TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND 
COGNITIVE MAPPING PERSPECTIVE  
 
SUMMARY 
Maritime transport is generally regarded as an important enabler of the world trade 
and plays a crucial role in the global system. Maritime transport is also a significant 
exportable service in many countries and in the process contributes directly to 
national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and essential to the proper operation of any 
country’s economy and a vital part of a nation’s infrastructure. Most of the world 
trade’s is being conducted by maritime transport system.  Maritime transportation is 
carried out in water environment. Ports shape the start and the end point of this kind 
of transportation. Seaports are very important, which are an inseparable part of this 
transport, in terms of presence, necessity and economic activity. In addition to their 
commercial effects, seaports have also strategic and socio-economic effects on their 
regions. Clearly, due to their effects on maritime trade, seaports are the doors 
opening to the outside world and breathing points for a country. Because of 
transnational flows of goods and people; ports and maritime transport has been 
exposed to several types of security threats. Piracy, robbery attacks, terrorist attacks, 
illegal migrations, smuggling, human and drug trafficking are the most noticeable 
threats. 
Building the defences against any threat to maritime security is essential in order to 
achieve safe, secure and efficient shipping, which is the prime objective of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). The International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) is a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the 
security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to 
ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code set new standards of 
security for ships and port facilities around the world. However, recent security 
breaches and incidents have shown that ISPS Code did not provide desired level of 
security neither for ships nor for port facilities. 
This study addresses analytical analysis of the ISPS Code from quality perspective 
by using Fishbone Diagram (Ishikawa Diagram) and Pareto Chart techniques and 
brainstorming sessions for quality defect prevention in order to identify potential 
factors causing an overall effect process. Fish-bone diagram is prepared to illustrate 
the problems effecting the ISPS Code’s implementation and Pareto charts are 
prepared for all the criteria to identify major causes in implementation of the ISPS 
Code. Finally, Cognitive-mapping method is used to determine the relationship 
between the causes and sub causes which was identified in Fish-bone diagram to see 
how the causes and sub causes affect each other. 
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ISPS KOD UYGULAMA SÜRECİNDEKİ UYGUNSUZLUKLARIN TOPLAM 
KALİTE YÖNETİMİ VE BİLİŞSEL HARİTALAMA YÖNTEMİ 
KULLANILARAK KIYASLAMALI ANALİZİ 
ÖZET 
Denizyolu taşımacılığı sistemi, küresel tedarik zinciri içerisinde üretilen malların 
tüketici pazarlarına ulaştırılmasında multi-modal ulaştırma ağının limanlar arasındaki 
deniz geçişinin gemilerle sağlandığı kısmını kapsamaktadır. Günümüzde dünya 
ticaretinin yaklaşık % 90’ı denizyolu ile gerçekleştirilmektedir. Dünya deniz 
ticaretinden yılda 400 Milyar Dolar gelir elde edilmektedir. Bu rakamlar denizyolu 
taşımacılığının ne derecede önemli bir konuma geldiğini göstermektedir. Deniz 
taşımacılığının ülke ekonomilerindeki yeri gelişmekte, bu sebeple limanlar ve deniz 
araçlarının önemi de artmaktadır. Özellikle sanayi hammaddelerini oluşturan yükleri 
bir seferde büyük tonajlarda taşıma özelliği, diğer taşıma yöntemlerine göre ucuz 
maliyeti (denizyolu ile yapılan taşımalar, demir yoluna göre 3,5; karayoluna göre 7; 
havayoluna göre ise 22 kat daha ucuz gerçekleşmektedir), denizyolu taşımalarının 
önemli avantajları arasındadır. Petrol, doğalgaz ve madenlerin önemli bir kısmının 
denizler altında bulunması, dünyanın dörtte üçünün sulardan oluşması, denizyolu 
ticaretinin önemini artıran unsurlar arasındadır. Kuru yük ticareti ve konteynerlerdeki 
büyüme ile alevlenen dünya deniz ticareti 2011 senesinde yüzde dörtlük bir büyüme 
göstermiştir. 50.000’den fazla yük gemisi uluslararası olarak ticaret yapmaktadır ve 
her türlü kargo ulaşımını sağlamaktadır. Dünya ticaret filosu 150’den fazla ülkede 
kayıtlı ve bir milyondan fazla, hemen hemen her milletten denizci ile güçlendirilmiş 
durumdadır. Bu sayılar denizcilik ve ticaret arasındaki ilişkiyi ve gelişimi net bir 
şekilde gözler önüne sermektedir. Denizyolu ticareti birçok ülkede kayda değer bir 
ihraç edilebilir servistir ve süreçte direkt olarak ulusal Gayri Safi Yurtiçi Hasıla’ya 
(GSYH) katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu yüzden, ticaret, GSYH ve denizyolu taşımacılığı 
dünya finansal sisteminin ayrılmaz birer parçalarıdır. Denizyolu ticareti dünyanın 
dört bir yanındaki müşteriler için rekabete dayanan taşıma masrafları açısından yarar 
sağlayarak büyümeye devam etmektedir. Bu sebeple, modern dünya için gerekli 
ölçekte malların ithalat ve ihracatı denizcilik olmadan mümkün değildir. Denizyolu 
ticaretinin küresel ekonomideki rolü dikkate alındığında, herhangi bir saldırı veya 
tehdit olasılığının dahi bir limanı olumsuz olarak etkilemesi ve birkaç gün içerisinde 
bölge ekonomisini yıkıma uğratması söz konusu olabilecektir. Denizyolu taşımacılığı 
limanlarda başlayıp, limanlarda tamamlanan bir süreçtir.  
Liman, feribot ve yolcu gemisi terminalleri genellikle çok sayıda insanın yaşadığı ve 
çalıştığı kalabalık bölgelere kurulmuştur. Milyarlarca yük ve binlerce insanın her gün 
girip çıkmakta olduğu dünya limanlarında personel ve gemileri, barınak ve iskeleleri,  
rıhtım tesisleri ve kargoları olası tehditlerden sürekli olarak koruma gerekliliği 
güvenlik personeline oldukça stresli önemli görevler yüklemiştir. Uluslararası mal ve 
insan akışı sebebiyle; limanlar ve deniz yolu taşımacılığı çok sayı ve tipte güvenlik 
tehdidi ile karşı karşıya bulunmaktadır. Tedarik zincirinin en önemli halkalarından 
olan limanlarda bir an bile yaşanacak duraksama telafisi zor ekonomik kayıplara yol 
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açmaktadır. Limanlar ekonomik anlamda ulaşım hatları üzerindeki düğüm noktaları 
olmalarından dolayı sahip oldukları önemin yanı sıra ülkelerin dış dünyaya açılan 
pencereleri olarak da büyük önem taşımaktadırlar.  Ekonominin yanı sıra sosyal 
ilişkilerin ve kıtalar arası etkileşimlerin idamesinde önemli roller oynamaktadır. Hem 
ekonomik hem de sosyal hayata katkı sağlamaktadır. Bu denli stratejik önemi haiz 
olan deniz limanları yapısal ve kurumsal, ekonomik, finansal, yönetsel, çevresel ve 
rekabet açılarından pek çok risk ve tehlikeler ile karşı karşıyadır. Bu risk ve 
tehlikelerin tespit ve tanımının yapılması, alınacak tedbirler ve yapılacak eylemler 
için son derece önemlidir. Korsanlık, hırsızlık ve terör saldırıları, yasadışı göçler, 
kaçakçılık, insan ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı en çok göze çarpan tehditlerdir. Tüm bu 
bilgiler ışığında, deniz taşımacılığının, düzenli olarak gelişimi ve sürdürülebilmesi 
için, tüm nakliye süreci boyunca korunması gerekmektedir.  
Denizyolu taşımacılığının dünya ticaretinin belkemiğini oluşturmasından dolayı, 
uluslararası ulaşım sisteminin yukarıda belirtilen tehlikelerden korunması maksadı 
ile etkili ve uygulanabilir önlemlere ihtiyaç duyulmuş, limanların uluslararası 
anlaşmalar ve düzenlemelere uygunluğunun sağlanması için Uluslararası Denizcilik 
Örgütü (International Maritime Organization – IMO) tarafından güvenlik konusunda 
bütüncül bir yaklaşımla güvenli, emniyetli ve etkili bir deniz ulaştırması için deniz 
yoluyla oluşabilecek güvenlik tehditlerinin önlenmesi ve karşı tedbirlerin 
geliştirmesine yönelik önemli adımlar atılmıştır.  
Denizlerde terör olaylarının 2000’li yılların başında gözle görülür biçimde artması 
dikkatleri denizlerin güvenlik ihtiyacına çevirmiştir. Özellikle 2000 yılında 
Yemen’in Aden Limanı’nda ABD’nin USS Cole muhribine yapılan 17 denizcinin 
ölümü ve 39 denizcinin yaralanması ile sonuçlanan terör saldırısı denizlerdeki terör 
olaylarının farklı şekilde değerlendirilmesinin miladı kabul edilebilir. Çünkü bu 
saldırıdan önce hakim olan “limanlarda olabilecek terör eylemlerinin genellikle 
karadan denize doğru olacağı” fikri ortadan kalkmış, “terör tehditinin öncelikle 
denizden gelebileceği” düşüncesi hakim olmaya başlamıştır. (Solmaz, 2012). 11 
Eylül 2001’deki trajik olayları takiben, gemi ve liman tesisleri güvenliği ile bağıntılı 
yeni önlemler geliştirilmesine Uluslararası Denizcilik Örgütü Meclisi tarafından 
yirmi ikinci oturumda oybirliği ile karar verilmiştir (ISPS Code). IMO Deniz 
Emniyeti Komitesi tarafından denizde ya da deniz yoluyla olabilecek terör 
eylemlerinin önlenmesine yönelik yeni kuralların belirlenmesi amacıyla çalışmalara 
başlanmıştır. Çalışmalar devam ederken 2002 tarihinde Fransız süper tankeri 
Limburg’a yapılan terör saldırısı, deniz güvenliği konusunda çalışma yapılmasına 
olan ihtiyacı bir kez daha ortaya koymuştur. ISPS Kuralları, 1974 yılındaki 
Uluslararası Denizde Can Güvenliği Sözleşmesi (SOLAS) Bölüm XI-2 Deniz 
güvenliğini arttırmak için özel önlemler başlığından yola çıkarak uygulanmıştır. Hem 
SOLAS Bölüm XI-2 hem de ISPS Kod Kuralları, 1 Temmuz 2004 senesinde 
yürürlüğe girmiştir. ISPS Kod Kuralları uluslararası alanda ve yaygın olarak kabul 
gören, denizcilik endüstrisini, denizyolu ticaretini ve dünya ekonomisini terörizm 
konusunda emniyet altına almaya ve limanlar ile gemiler arasındaki işbirliği ve 
koordinasyona odaklanmış ilk proaktif düzenleyici çerçevedir.  
ISPS Kod’un amaçları; güvenlik tehditlerini tespit etmek ve uluslararası ticaretle 
iştigal eden gemileri ve liman tesislerini etkileyen güvenlik eylemlerine karşı 
önleyici tedbirler almak amacıyla SOLAS 74 Sözleşmesine taraf olan Devletler, 
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Hükümet kuruluşları, yerel makamlar, denizcilik ve liman işleticileri arasında 
işbirliğini kapsayan uluslararası bir yapı tesis etmek; denizde güvenliği temin etmek 
için SOLAS 74 Sözleşmesine taraf olan Devletler, Hükümet kuruluşları, yerel 
makamlar, denizcilik ve liman işleticilerinin görev ve sorumluluklarını belirlemek, 
güvenlikle ilgili bilgilerin erken ve etkin bir şekilde toplanmasını ve bilgi alış-
verişini temin etmek, Değişen güvenlik seviyelerine hazırlıklı olarak hareket 
edebilmek için yeterli ve düzgün plan ve prosedürlere sahip olabilmek maksadıyla, 
güvenlik değerlendirmeleri için bir metodoloji temin etmek, denizlerde güvenliği 
tesis etmek üzere uygun ve yeterli tedbirlerin alınabilmesi için gerekli ortamı 
sağlamaktır. 
Bu çalışma, ISPS Kod sözleşmesi uygulama süresindeki genel etki sürecine neden 
olan potansiyel problemleri tespit etmek amacıyla kalite kusurlarının önlenmesi için 
Balık Kılçığı (Ishikawa) Diyagramı ve Pareto Diyagramı tekniklerini ve beyin 
fırtınası oturumlarını kullanarak, ISPS Kod Kurallarının kalite perspektifinden 
çözümsel ve sistematik analizini sunmaktadır. Balık Kılçığı diyagramı kalite 
problemlerinin kök nedenlerini tanımlamak için kullanılan bir araçtır. Balık Kılçığı 
diyagramı, etkilere ve bu etkileri yaratan veya onlara katkıda bulunan sebeplere 
sistematik bir bakış sağlayan bir analiz aracıdır. Diyagramın şekli bi balığın 
iskeletine benzer. Ana problem balığın baş bölgesinde belirtilir ve problemlerin olası 
sebepleri diyagramın ‘balık kılçığı’ bölgesinde gösterilir. Sürecin dört ana adımı 
bulunmaktadır: problemin tespit edilmesi; dahil olan ana faktörlerin irdelenmesi; 
olası sebeplerin tanımlanması; ve sebep ve sonuç diyagramının analiz edilmesi Bu 
çalışmada,  “Limanlar için Güvenlik İhlalleri ve Olaylar’’ ana problem olarak 
belirlenmiştir. Beklenen güvenlik seviyesini etkileyen 6 temel neden olduğu 
bulunmuştur. Risk Yönetimi Süreci, Güvenlik Farkındalığı, Standardizasyon, İzleme 
ve Denetleme Süreci, Eğitim ve Gemi Tipleri ISPS Kod Kurallarının uygulama 
prosedürü sırasında asıl problemi etkileyen sebepler olarak tespit edilmiştir. Pareto 
analizi, kullanıcılara problemin %80’ini çözmek için ilgilenilmesi gereken en önemli 
nedenlerini tespit etmekte yardımcı olan bir tekniktir. Pareto çizelgesi, yükseklikleri 
problemlerin frekans veya etkilerini gösteren sütunlar dizidir. Sütunlar soldan sağa 
yüksekliklere göre azalan sırayla düzenlenir. Daha uzun sütunlarca temsil edilen 
soldaki kategoriler sağdakilere göre daha fazla önem sahibidir. Bu sütun grafik 
“gerekli az” ile “gereksiz çok”u ayırmakta kullanılmaktadır.  
Balık Kılçığı Diyagramı ile nedenler bulunduktan sonra, majör olanların tespiti için 
anket hazırlanmıştır. Ankette, akademisyenlere, liman yetkililerine ve gemi 
kaptanlarına Risk Yönetimi, Güvenlik Farkındalığı, Standardizasyon, Gemi Tipi, 
Eğitim, İzleme ve Gözetleme Süreci gibi ISPS Kod Kurallarının kalitesine dair 
problemlerin değerlendirilmesi hakkında sorular sorulmuştur. Bu sonuçlara Pareto 
analizi uygulanarak sebeplerin öncelik sırası gösterilmiştir. Daha sonra ise, Balık 
kılçığı diyagramıyla bulunan ana sebep ve alt sebeplerin birbiriyle olan ilişkisini 
bulmak amacıyla bilişsel haritalama yöntemine başvurulmuştur. Bilişsel harita, 
kavramlar ve bu kavramlar arasındaki bağlantıların bir bileşimidir. Bağlantılar, 
kavramlar arasındaki ilişkiyi ifade eder. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Maritime transport is generally regarded as an important enabler of the world trade 
and plays a crucial role in the global system. The origin of it dates back over 5000 
years to Mesopotamia. As actualized 5000 years ago, today seas and mariners 
continue to connect the people and continents. Today around 90% of the world trade 
is carried by this sector. Fuelled by strong growth in container and dry bulk trades, 
world seaborne trade grew by 4 per cent in 2011, taking the total volume of goods 
loaded worldwide to 8.7 billion tons. Besides, world fleet reached more than 1.5 
billion deadweight tons in January 2012 (UNCTAD, 2012). There are over 50,000 
merchant ships trading internationally, transporting every kind of cargo. The world 
fleet is registered in over 150 nations, and manned by over a million seafarers of 
virtually every nationality. The worldwide population of seafarers serving on 
internationally trading merchant ships is estimated to be in the order of 466,000 
officers and 721,000 ratings (ICS, 2013).These numbers certainly shows the 
development and relation between trade and maritime transportation. Maritime 
transport is also a significant exportable service in many countries and in the process 
contributes directly to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough, 2006). So, we can mention that trade, GDP and maritime transportation 
are the integral parts of world financial system. Seaborne trade continues to expand, 
bringing benefits for consumers across the world through competitive freight costs. 
That’s why without shipping the import and export of goods on the scale necessary 
for the modern world would not be possible. 
Ports are defined as geographical, physical and juridical entities; the word “port” 
usually encompasses waterway connections, i.e. the regions of sea, lake, river, inner 
waterways and canals (Wood et al., 2002).Maritime transportation is carried out in 
water environment. Ports shape the start and the end point of this kind of 
transportation. Thus, a port can be defined, in broad terms, as the start or the end 
point of maritime transportation or as a transportation infrastructure where the 
medium of the transport changes during the transportation service (Akten, 1992). In 
2 
the process of globalization, the restrictions on production and commercial activity 
have lessened, and the volume of production has increased, the distance between the 
centres of production and consumption have increased; the importance of maritime 
transportation has increased and even more this has led to the growth of the share of 
maritime transportation in logistic costs. In this respect, the condition of ports is 
highly crucial from the point of total cost of logistics systems. Most of the world 
trade’s is being conducted by maritime transport system manifests the particular 
importance of sea ports, which are an inseparable part of this transport, in terms of 
presence, necessity and economic activity. In addition to their commercial effects, 
sea ports have also strategic and socio-economic effects on their regions. Clearly, 
due to their effects on maritime trade, sea ports are the doors opening to the outside 
world and breathing points for a country (Marlow, 2000).  
In general, the type of a port is built on a basis of many different aspects, such as 
scale, service influence area (service influence area) access, location, etc. In 
literature, there are different classifications such as upstream and downstream ports, 
city ports and industrial ports and small, medium, large ports, and so on (Langen, 
2002). Additionally, in the studies conducted, stylized port classifications have also 
been developed. Types of ports are classified in terms of their establishment, 
geographical properties and fields of service (Keskin, 2006). In addition, the 
definition of port is used not only for seaports but also for air terminals due to legal 
necessities (Bolat, 2010). 
While selecting the position for a port, the geographical properties of the region have 
a crucial role. First, port freight traffic must be on international sea routes or very 
close to such an arterial route. So, the distance to the main arterial does not grow 
much and the time and cost losses are minimized. Behind a port, for the continuous 
flow of commodities coming from sea, primarily land and railway, additionally air 
transport must be provided (Gedik, 2007). Traditionally, site selection of ports 
usually takes place in natural harbors which have geographical advantages that can 
fulfil the future needs of population growth. The suitability of a port site is controlled 
by conducting land and environmental survey, by examining coastal motions and 
water depths, and by doing boring and other necessary ground studies to obtain a 
complete idea about the characteristic of the ground (Topaloğlu, 2007). In 
establishment stage of ports, many natural factors such as depth of water, suitable 
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structure of land, feasibility of docking area, effect of wave motions, sedimentation, 
etc. affect the location selection. The depth which a port has or will have will create a 
constraint in the properties of the docking ships during the port’s commercial life. 
Meteorological and oceanographic analyses such as determining prevailing winds’ 
magnitude and directions, recurrence of storms, wave heights and impacts, tide 
durations, amounts and level changes of high and low water levels, directions and 
speeds of prevailing streams must be conducted (Topaloğlu, 2007). Inside the port, 
adequate amount of space for ships’ easily approaching to docks, manoeuvring and 
turning must be taken into account. To determine technical factors such as coastal 
condition, depths, shore condition, topography of the area, streams, and sand 
motions, hydrologic, seismic, geologic, geophysical, meteorological, and topographic 
studies are conducted (Branch, 1986). Being located in a strategically important 
geographical position provides a competitive advantage in achieving the mentioned 
objectives. However, geographical position alone is not a sufficient factor. The 
region must be open in terms of economic factors, for industrial investment and 
industrial development. In addition, land costs should be low since large scale land 
investments are needed for port area and land expanding costs should be economical 
when needed. Incentives and tax practices prepared for development priority regions 
and industrial parks should be considered. With regard to the labour provided from 
the region, regional wage levels should be taken into account. Port construction 
costs, the inputs and outputs of the business, transportation costs and energy 
expenditures should be analysed (Yüksel, 1998). The future sea trade potential of the 
region should be determinable. Additionally, by considering political and military 
priorities, the port’s location should be evaluated in terms of being in parallel to the 
country’s political, economic and strategic priorities. Ports are a source of cost for 
carriers and carries want to stop by in ports with larger load potential. In this sense, 
since there will be an interaction with other ports in the region, it must be evaluated 
whether there is another port in the area and if there is, its effect on the port to be 
built, while selecting the location for ports (Gedik, 2010). 
 
Ports are not only the connection points of land and sea in freight and passenger 
transportation; at the same time, they also have the production function. For 
countries having a coast, ports have great shares in economies. Via the economic 
boost which a port creates by being a part of the social structure of the region it 
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belongs, it feeds many other sectors in the background. It increases not only regional 
and international trade, but at the same time industrial activities (Baran, 2010). When 
it is thought that the 90% of the world maritime trade is conducted on seas, the effect 
of ports on economy can be understood better. Even a small stop in ports, which are 
among the most important links of supply chains results in hard-to-recover economic 
losses. The interruption of the supply chain in Japan and Thailand due to natural 
disasters was listed among the main reasons of the slowdown of the world trade and 
GDP in 2011(TÜRKLİM, 2012). In addition to the economic importance the ports; 
they have great importance for being countries’ windows to the outside world. Along 
with the economy, they play an important role in maintaining social relations and 
intercontinental interactions. They contribute to both economic and social life. Ports, 
which have such strategic importance, face many risks and threats in terms of 
structural and institutional, economic, financial, administrative, environmental and 
competition aspects. Determining and defining these risks and threats is very 
important for measures and actions to be taken (Gedik, 2007).  
1.1 Maritime Security 
 
Ports, ferry and liner terminals are usually established in crowded regions where 
many people live and work. Every day, billions of cargos and thousands of people go 
in and out of ports all around the world. On the other hand, ports can be referred as 
border posts as well. When considered in this manner; ports, which are the doors of 
countries opening to the outside world, can become targets for terrorist groups 
seeking a global impact. In this sense, security management cannot be left aside from 
the installation and operating processes of ports. 
Considering the role of maritime trade in the global economy, an attack or any threat 
can affect adversely a port for and within a few days could destroy the regional 
economy. Taking all these information into account, maritime transportation needs to 
be protected during all transportation process. This process begins in ports and ends 
in ports. Port, ferry, and cruise-ship terminals are often located in highly congested 
areas where large numbers of people live and work. With billions of goods and 
thousands of people moving in and out of world ports every day, the incredible 
pressure on security personnel that should constantly safeguard vessels, harbors, 
ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from various threats can be an overwhelming 
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task (url 1). Because of transnational flows of goods and people; ports and maritime 
transport has been exposed to several types of security threats. Piracy, robbery 
attacks, terrorist attacks, illegal migrations, smuggling, human and drug trafficking 
are the most noticeable threats. “The maritime realms of ports are key intersections 
of insecurity and security” (Chalk, 2008). The broadly conceptualized “maritime 
terrorism” in both literature and legislation covers insecurities such as “human 
causalities, economic losses environmental damage or other negative impacts, alone 
or in combination, of minor or major consequences” (Parfomak and Frittelli, 2007). 
Since maritime transportation generates the backbone of the world trade, effective 
and applicable security measures are needed to ensure that the international transport 
system is protected from the acts of above mentioned threats. To effectively deter or 
deny these threats, ports must develop a security strategy that identifies the potential 
threats, defines critical assets and information, integrates security resources and 
capabilities, and ensures the successful design, implementation and management of a 
world class seaport security program (McNicholas,2002).As an effect, a more unified 
approach of security has been laid upon ports by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) to make sure that ports comply with international treaties and 
regulations (Wenning et al.,2007).  
1.2 The ISPS Code 
 
Building the defenses against any threat to maritime security is essential in order to 
achieve safe, secure and efficient shipping, which is the prime objective of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). Following the tragic events of 11th 
September 2001, the twenty-second session of the Assembly of the International 
Maritime Organization in November 2001, unanimously agreed to the development 
of new measures relating to the security of ships and of port facilities (url 2). Besides 
9/11 as the prioritized just cause for the ISPS to take effect, two other attacks also 
influenced the design of the ISPS Code: the 12 December 2002 ‘attack on the French 
tanker “Limburg” off the coast of Yemen in October 2002 and the ramming of “USS 
Cole” by a small boat laden with explosives in 2000’ (Burmester, 2005). The 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is a comprehensive 
set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in 
response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 
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attacks in the United States. The ISPS Code is implemented through chapter XI-2 
Special measures to enhance maritime security in the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974.
 
Both SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and ISPS Code 
entered into force on the 1 July 2004. The IMO is determined to design a more 
systematic maritime security training scheme and this was agreed with a set of three-
level security training and knowledge requirements for the Ship Security Officer, for 
shipboard personnel having specific security related duties and for all other 
shipboard personnel (Albayrak et al., 2010).  The ISPS Code is the first ever 
internationally and widely agreed proactive regulatory framework to safeguard the 
maritime industry, seaborne trade, and the world economy from terrorism and aimed 
to focus on the cooperation and coordination between ports and ships (Yılmazel & 
Asyalı, 2005). The dialectic between post-9/11 rhetoric of insecurity actual presence 
of physical insecurity in ports, multifaceted and interconnected, pushes all ports ‘to 
perceive and manage security threats through integrating local/domestic threat- level 
into a global awareness-level ‘(Bichou, 2004). 
The objective of this code is to establish an international framework involving co-
operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local 
administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect/assess security threats 
and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port 
facilities used in international trade. It aims to establish the respective roles and 
responsibilities of all these parties concerned, at the national and international level, 
for ensuring maritime security. To ensure early and efficient collation and exchange 
of security-related information it provides a methodology for security assessments to 
have in place plans and procedures to react to changing security levels that adequate 
and proportionate maritime security measures are in place. The objectives are to be 
achieved by the designation of appropriate officers/personnel’s on each ship, in each 
port facility and in each shipping company to prepare and to put into effect the 
security plans that will be approved for each ship and port facility. Part A and B of 
the Code are, respectively, the mandatory requirements regarding the provisions of 
chapter XI-2 of SOLAS,1974, as amended, and guidance regarding the provisions of 
chapter XI-2 of SOLAS,1974, as amended, and part A of the Code. Table 1.1 
indicates the mandatory requirements of the ISPS Code. 
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This Code applies to; passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft, cargo 
ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnages and upwards;  mobile 
offshore drilling units; and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international 
voyages. In essence, the ISPS Code sets out to ensure security of ships and port 
facilities through a risk management process. To determine what security measures 
are appropriate, an assessment of each of these risks has to be made. In terms of the 
ISPS Code, a security risk is seen as the threat of an attack, coupled with the 
vulnerability of the target and the consequences of such an attack taking place. As a 
standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risks is provided by the ISPS 
Code; this also allows the contracting governments to circulate any increased change 
in the overall perceived threat, confident in the knowledge that pre-approved 
increased responses to security measures on ships and within port facilities will take 
place. Within the ISPS Code and the security framework it strives to ensure, 
minimum security-related requirements have been introduced for ships and port 
facilities. The basic concepts are outlined below.  
 
For ships, these requirements include:  
  - Creation of ship security plans (SSPs);  
  -Appointment and training of ship security officers (SSOs);  
  -Appointment and training of (shipping) company security officers (CSOs);  
  -Ongoing training of crew and carrying out drills and exercises;  
  -Identification of onboard items of security related equipment.  
  
For port facilities, these requirements include:  
  -Creation of port facility security plans (PFSPs);  
  -Appointment and training of port facility security officers (PFSOs);  
  -Ongoing training of staff and carrying out drills and exercises;  
  -Identification of items of security related equipment.  
 
In addition, the ISPS Code further demands that ships and port facilities have in 
place measures to ensure effective:  
  -Monitoring and control over access to the ship or port facility;  
  -Monitoring of the activities of people and cargo;  
  -Readily available security communications.  
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Recognizing that each ship (or even class of ship) and each port facility will 
undoubtedly present different security related risks, the methods by which they meet 
their obligations in terms of the ISPS Code will vary greatly. These differing 
response measures are in effect formulated into either ship or port facility security 
plans, with these plans ultimately being approved by the administration (flag state) or 
contracting government.  
In terms of the ISPS Code, contracting governments have various responsibilities, 
including; setting the security level; approving SSPs and any amendments to a 
previously approved plan; verifying compliance of ships with the provisions of 
SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code; issuing the relevant international 
ship security certificates (ISSC); determining which port facilities located within 
their territory are required to designate and train a PFSO; ensuring completion and 
approval of the PFSA and PFSP or any subsequent PFSP amendment; issuing 
statements of compliance for port facilities; exercising control and compliance 
measures over ships. The contracting government is also responsible for 
communicating security-related information to IMO and to the shipping and port 
industries. In order to communicate the security threat to a port facility or a ship, the 
contracting government will firstly set the appropriate security level based on its 
assessment of all available current security intelligence.  
Security levels are identified as security level 1, 2, or 3 and these in-general terms 
correspond to a normal, heightened and exceptional threat situation, respectively:  
 Security Level 1 - The level for which minimum appropriate protective 
security measures shall be maintained at all times.  
 Security Level 2 - The level for which appropriate additional protective 
security measures must be maintained for a period of time as a result of 
heightened risk of a security incident.  
 Security Level 3 -  The level for which further specific protective security 
measures must be maintained for a limited period of time when a security 
incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify 
the specific target.  
The identification and communicating of the security levels by the contracting 
government further helps establish good links between ships and port facilities as 
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each security level change triggers the implementation of pre-arranged, relevant 
security measures each will have to have in place. To do this effectively requires 
there to be in place a means of good liaison between the CSO, SSO and PFSO. 
Under the terms of the ISPS Code, shipping companies are required to designate and 
train a CSO (at least one per company) and to have in place designated and trained 
SSOs for each of their ships. The CSO’s responsibilities include making sure a SSA 
is properly carried out for each ship and that suitable ship-specific SSPs are 
thereafter prepared and submitted for approval. Approval of each SSP is normally by 
the administration (flag state). Thereafter, the SSP is used onboard the ship with 
responsibility falling onto the SSO to oversee successful implementation. In general 
terms, the SSP indicates the operational and physical security measures the ship will 
take to ensure it always is able to operate at security level 1. The SSP also indicates 
additional, or intensified, security measures the ship must take to move up to and 
operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore, the SSP indicates 
possible preparatory actions the ship could take to allow prompt response to any 
instructions that may be issued to the ship at security level 3. The setting of a security 
level is solely the responsibility of a contracting government. However, a Master or 
SSO can enhance the security measures that are in place on board the ship at any 
time. An example could be when the vessel is sailing through an area of increased 
vulnerability.  The training of the ship’s crew in terms of security practices linked to 
the SSP and the carrying out of regular security related drills and exercises are the 
responsibility of both the CSO and SSO.  
These individuals are also responsible for ensuring proper security-related records 
are maintained and that any security equipment used on board the ship is functioning 
properly.  Ships are issued an international ship security certificate (ISSC) by their 
administration, indicating they comply with the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-
2 and part A of the ISPS Code. Ships must thereafter maintain documentary evidence 
of continued compliance with this legislation, as when a ship is in or proceeding to a 
port it can be subjected to various control and compliance measures by the 
contracting government. These can include the ship being subjected to port state 
control inspections or additional control measures if the contracting government has 
reason to believe the security of the ship or the port facility has been compromised. 
There may even be circumstances in which entry into a port could be denied. The 
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ISPS Code also introduces a number of significant changes to the way ships operate, 
even at the basic security level 1. One aspect is the need to effectively control access 
to the vessel at all times. Depending on the security measures in place on a ship, 
personnel may find they have to sign on and off when joining or leaving. This can 
include sub-contractors or visitors who may well have to produce adequate 
identification/photographic identification before being al owed on board. 
Unexpected/unauthorized personnel may not be al owed on board and often 
appropriate notices warning of this will be on display. They may also be liable to a 
search of both their persons and baggage. Cargo and project equipment may also be 
subjected to similar levels of security search prior to being loaded on board.  
Every contracting government will ensure a PFSA is conducted for each of its port 
facilities located within territory that serves ships engaged on international voyages. 
This PFSA helps the contracting government determine which port facilities require 
to appoint and train a PFSO and have a suitable PFSP prepared. The preparation and 
subsequent implementation of the PFSP is the responsibility of the PFSO.  As is the 
case with ships, this security plan indicates operational and physical security 
measures the port facility must have in place to ensure it always operates at security 
level 1. The plan will also indicate additional or intensified security measures the 
port facility will take to move up to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to 
do so. It will also indicate the possible preparatory actions the port facility could take 
to allow prompt response to any instructions that may be issued at security level 3. 
The training of port staff in terms of the PFSP procedures and the carrying out of 
regular security related drills and exercises is the responsibility of the PFSO.  The 
PFSO is also responsible for ensuring proper security-related records are maintained 
and that any security equipment used within the facility is subject to regular 
maintenance.  In some areas of the world ships may be requested by the PFSO to 
provide information on a number of matters, such as ship’s cargo, details of 
passengers or ship's personnel and, very often, information identifying the ship’s last 
ten ports of call .  Some countries seek this information no later than 24-hours prior 
to the ship's entry into the port. This is because ships using designated port facilities 
may be subject to port state control inspections/additional control measures.  
To facilitate the latter part of this obligation, the PFSO will provide relevant 
information highlighted by the ship to the port’s contracting government, who will 
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dictate any further action necessary.  A ship already operating at a higher security 
level than that of the port will remain at that higher security level. There is no 
requirement for the port to increase its security level to match the ship. In these 
circumstances, however, the Master/SSO and PFSO may follow an additional 
procedure within the ISPS Code and communicate with one another to agree on any 
other necessary security measures to be put in place. However, if a ship is operating 
at a lower security level than the port, then the ship must raise its security level to 
equal that of the port.  This means that the ship’s crew, visitors, project staff, 
contractors and al others onboard must be prepared to respond to any instruction 
from the SSO as part of complying with this requirement, as ships must have the 
ability to immediately achieve this change and to be able to maintain the higher 
security level required.  
Table 1.1: The mandatory requirements of The Isps Code. 
Section 1 General  
Section 2 Definitions  
Section 3 Application  
Section 4 Responsibilities of Contracting Governments  
Section 5 Declaration of Security  
Section 6 Obligations of the Company  
Section 7 Ship Security  
Section 8 Ship Security Assessment (SSA)  
Section 9 Ship Security Plan (SSP)  
Section 10 Records  
Section 11 Company Security Officer (CSO)  
Section 12 Ship Security Officer (SSO)  
Section 13 Training, Drills and Exercises on Ship Security  
Section 14 Port Facility Security  
Section 15 Port Facility Security Assessment  
Section 16 Port Facility Security Plan  
Section 17 Port Facility Security Officer  
Section 18 Training and Drills on Port Facility Security  
Section 19 Verification and Certification  
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1.3 Aim of the Thesis 
 
The introduction of the ISPS Code may have significantly reduced maritime attacks 
by terrorists since 1 July 2004 (Surhone et al., 2010). But, the ISPS Code is not a 
panacea against all maritime threats (Goh, 2006). Recent security breaches and 
incidents have shown that ISPS Code did not provide desired level of security neither 
for ships nor port facilities. Although these regulations have improved maritime 
security, gaps and regulatory bottlenecks remain (Ferriere et al., 2005). Mazaheri and 
Ekwall, 2009 summarized the disadvantages of the ISPS Code as higher operative 
expenses and a high implementation cost and also ISPS Code Part B may lead to 
problems due to existence of discordance. The improper implementation of the ISPS 
Code in some countries created some difficulties to the seafarers’, such as refusal of 
shore leave, identity cards, piracy procedures and stowaway prevention (Balbaa, 
2005). Several authors (Griffett, 2005; Stevenson, 2005) point out the effects that the 
ISPS Code has on seafarers’ lives and it may restrict human rights and limit access to 
the ship. Ran (2005) and Stevenson (2005) believe that different interpretations of 
the code in different countries are one of the ISPS Code’s weaknesses. Effective 
implementation in port facilities in different countries varies significantly, 
experiencing numerous difficulties. These difficulties are mostly caused by limited 
economic potentials, differing positions on the status of national and international 
maritime security system, and finally, different understanding what mitigation 
measures should be accepted as appropriate in different countries (Zec et al., 2010). 
Differing risk profiles and standards applied between nations, applicability of the 
code to different vessel types are also pointed out by Ran, 2005.As seen above many 
academicians evaluated the effectiveness of the ISPS Code from different point of 
view and commented on shortcomings of the ISPS Code. A literature table is given 
in Table 1.2 chronogically. 
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Table 1. 2: Literature table related to The Isps Code 
Aim of the paper Methodology Authors & 
Date 
To analyze and assess operational risk within 
the port terminals at the RO–RO activity. 
AHP multicriteria 
approach 
Mabrouki, C., 
Bentaleb, F., 
Mousrij, A. 
(2014) 
To facilitate the quantitative analysis of port 
facility security assessment (PFSA). 
Fuzzy evidential 
reasoning  
Wang, J.,  
NG, Adolf., 
Yang, Z. 
(2014) 
To identify level of risk on sea ports. Interviev survey, 
questionnaire survey, risk 
map 
Chang, C., 
Xu, J., Song, 
D. (2014) 
To develop a port security economic model to 
evaluate the impacts of port security policies to 
container volumes. 
System Dynamics (SD) Gi-Tae Yeo, 
G., Pak, J., 
Yang, Z. 
(2013) 
To analyse and discuss the United States (US) 
and the European Union (EU) approaches on 
maritime transport and port security, in a 
comparative way. 
Analysis of Policy and 
regulatory frameworks 
 
Papa, P. 
(2013) 
To focus on the strategic issues, policy 
framework and its consequences for the future 
Indian scenario. 
Evaluation of Indian 
Maritime Policy 
Panigrahi, J., 
Pradhan, A. 
(2012) 
 
To describe and evaluate the associated risk 
factors within the ports and terminals operations 
and management.  
 
Fuzzy set theory and 
evidential reasoning 
approach 
 
 
Mokhtari, K., 
Ren, J., 
Roberts ,C., 
Wang, J. 
(2012) 
To propose a generic bow-tie based risk 
analysis framework to identify and evaluate 
risks. 
Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) 
Mokhtari, K., 
Ren, J., 
Roberts ,C., 
Wang, J. 
(2011) 
To explore the ISPS Code 
practice at ports.             
Cognitive mapping Celik, 
M.,Topçu, İ. 
(2010) 
To implement of security                           
measures in small to medium  
developing countries. 
Legal framework & port 
status evaluation of 
Croatia 
Zec, D., 
Frančić, V., 
Hlača, M. 
(2010) 
To evaluate ISPS Code port security 
implementations’ effectiveness and Turkey’s 
implementations. 
Analysis of terrorist 
attacks 
Solmaz, M. 
(2010) 
To investigate if containers equipped with a 
small passive detector will register during 
transport the neutron irradiation by fissionable 
material such as plutonium in a measurable 
way. 
Monte-Carlo simulation Maenhout,G., 
Roo,F., 
Janssens,W. 
(2010) 
To find the impact of the ISPS code from a total  
port perspective. 
Electronic Questionnaire             Mazaheri, A., 
Ekwall, D. 
(2009) 
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To increase the speed of post-incident recovery 
amongst the APEC economies and the US to 
facilitate a resumption of trade after a terrorist 
incident. 
The APEC Trade 
Recovery Programme 
(TRP)  
Ho, J. (2009) 
To examine the adequacy of The ISPS Code in 
addressing 
 post 11/09/2001 maritime  
security threats faced by ships and ship’s crew. 
Overview of the Code  Goh, R. 
(2006) 
To highlight the need for enhanced crisis 
management capabilities within ports as part of 
a standard management repertoire and suggests 
a new classification scheme for mapping 
vulnerability within ports and across supply 
networks. 
Analysis of anti-
terrorism maritime 
initiatives 
Barnes, P., 
Oloruntoba, 
R. (2005) 
To identify critical maritime security gaps andto 
explore adapting existing 
commercial off-the-shelf technologies as 
possible solutions. 
Canada United States 
Cargo Security Project 
Ferriere, D., 
Pysareva, K., 
Rucinski, A. 
(2005). 
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While assessing the ISPS Code deficiencies, I used the quality techniques differently 
from them. This study addresses analytical analysis of the ISPS Code from quality 
perspective by using Fishbone Diagram (Ishikawa Diagram) and Pareto Chart 
techniques and brainstorming sessions for quality defect prevention in order to 
identify potential factors causing an overall effect process. Fish-bone diagram is 
prepared to illustrate the problems effecting the ISPS Code’s implementation and 
Pareto charts are prepared for all the criteria to identify major causes in 
implementation of the ISPS Code. Finally, Cognitive-mapping method is used to 
determine the relationship between the causes and sub causes which was identified in 
Fish-bone diagram to see how the causes and sub causes affect each other. 
This thesis intends to: 
1. Define the problem and its causes affecting the ISPS Code’s implementation 
2. Realize the order of importance of the causes affecting the ISPS Code’s 
implementation 
3. Find the relationship among the causes and sub causes  that affect the ISPS 
Code’s implementation 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Motivation 
 
In the process of globalization, the restrictions on production and commercial 
activity have lessened, and the volume of production has increased, the distance 
between the centres of production and consumption have increased; the importance 
of maritime transportation has increased and even more this has led to the growth of 
the share of maritime transportation in logistic costs. In this respect, the condition of 
ports is highly crucial from the point of total cost of logistics systems.Considering 
the role of maritime trade in the global economy, an attack or any threat can affect 
adversely a port for and within a few days could destroy the regional economy. 
Taking all these information into account, maritime transportation needs to be 
protected during all transportation process. 
Building the defences against any threat to maritime security is essential in order to 
achieve safe, secure and efficient shipping, which is the prime objective of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). The International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) is a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the 
security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to 
ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code set new standards of 
security for ships and port facilities around the world. However, recent security 
breaches and incidents have shown that ISPS Code did not provide desired level of 
security neither for ships nor for port facilities. 
In the third part of this thesis; it is aimed to define the problems affecting The ISPS 
Code’s implementation, to realize importance of problems and to find the 
relationship among the problems. At last part of the thesis, suggestions are 
represented. When the defined  problems clear up, we believe that the ISPS Code 
provide aimed level of security both for ships and port facilities. 
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2.2 Total Quality Management (TQM) 
The concept of quality has existed for many years, though it’s meaning has changed 
and evolved over time. In the early twentieth century, quality management meant 
inspecting products to ensure that they met speciﬁcations. In the 1940s, during World 
War II, quality became more statistical in nature. Statistical sampling techniques 
were used to evaluate quality, and quality control charts were used to monitor the 
production process. In the 1960s, with the help of so-called “quality gurus,” the 
concept took on a broader meaning. Quality began to be viewed as something that 
encompassed the entire organization, not only the production process. Since all 
functions were responsible for product quality and all shared the costs of poor 
quality, quality was seen as a concept that affected the entire organization (url 3). 
The concept of quality means different things depending on the nature of the 
business and industry, as well as the means of how performance characteristics of a 
particular product are especially when compared with the standards set in advance by 
the beneficiary or organization. Quality is to meet the expectations of the beneficiary 
or exceed them. Quality is defined as the suitability of the product to meet the 
intended use, or to meet the beneficiary expectations (Bank, 2000). 
Since the 1970s, competition based on quality has grown in importance and has 
generated tremendous interest, concern, and enthusiasm. Companies in every line of 
business are focusing on improving quality in order to be more competitive. In many 
industries quality excellence has become a standard for doing business. Companies 
that do not meet this standard simply will not survive. The term used for today’s new 
concept of quality is total quality management or TQM. Oakland (2000) views TQM 
as a comprehensive approach to improve competitiveness, efficiency, flexibility 
through planning, organization, and understanding each activity. The involvement of 
everyone at all levels including the adoption of a strategic view for management 
quality. Focusing on preventing problems before they occur requires attention to 
remove existing barriers. TQM can be defined through the description of the basis 
adopted by the principle of "total dedication to the beneficiary". The description of 
the output to achieve beneficiary’s loyalty to reach time and cost effectiveness. The 
continuous improvement through discussing various instruments and techniques to 
create climate of support and encouragement team work. TQM means a commitment 
to meet or exceed the needs of the beneficiary. The application of the principle 
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adoption to search for quality in any place of work, starting to identify the needs of 
the beneficiary, and the end the assessment the beneficiary is satisfaction (Oakland, 
2000).  
The U.S. Department of Defence (1989) defines Total Quality Management as “both 
a philosophy and a set of guiding principles that represent the foundation of a 
continuously improving organization”. TQM integrates fundamental management 
techniques, existing improvement efforts, and technical tools under a disciplined 
approach focused on continuous improvement (Schellong, 2008). Total Quality 
Management tools and techniques divided into categories as quantitative and non-
quantitative. The basic quantitative ones are statistical process control (SPC). 
Statistical process control often called ‘The Magnificent Seven’ consists of seven 
tools; Pareto Chart, Histogram, Process Flow Diagram, Control Charts, Scatter 
Diagram, Check Sheets and Cause & Effect (Fishbone) Diagram (Besterfield, 2009).  
In the first part of this paper, the above mentioned two of seven methods were used. 
These are fishbone diagrams and Pareto chart techniques. First and foremost, the 
effects of potential factors causing an overall effect process were detected by the 
assistance of conducted studies and experiences given from port security personnel. 
In the second step, the potential factors were designed as a fishbone diagram. After 
the completion of the Fishbone diagram so as to realize the order of importance of 
causes Pareto chart were used.  
2.2.1 Cause & Effect (Fishbone) Diagram Techniques 
 
Fishbone diagrams are casual diagrams created by Kaoru Ishikawa. The Fishbone 
(also known as Cause &Effect and Ishikawa) diagram is a tool for identifying the 
root causes of quality problems. Fishbone diagram is an analysis tool that provides a 
systematic way of looking at effects and the causes that create or contribute those 
effects. Because of the function of the fishbone diagram, it may be referred to as 
Cause and Effect diagram (Watson, 2004). The shape of the diagram looks like a 
skeleton of a fish. Main problem is stated in fish head and possible causes of the 
problems are stated in the ‘fish bones’ of the diagram. Fish bones’ are also 
subdivided into smaller bones. The representation can be simple, through bevel line 
segments which lean on an horizontal axis, suggesting the distribution of the multiple 
causes and sub-causes which produce them, but it can also be completed with 
18 
qualitative and quantitative appreciations, with names and coding of the risks which 
characterizes the causes and sub-causes, with elements which show their succession, 
but also with other different ways for risk treatment (Hekmatpanah, 2011). The 
process has four major steps: identifying the problem; working out the major factors 
involved; identifying possible causes; and analysing the cause and effect diagram 
(Dey, 2004). Fishbone diagrams are often used in needs assessment to assist in 
illustrating and/or communicating the relationships among several potential (or 
actual) causes of a performance problem. Likewise, these graphical representations 
of relationships between needs (i.e., discrepancies between desired and actual results) 
offer you a pragmatic tool for building a system of performance improvement 
interventions (for instance, a combination of mentoring, job aids, training, 
motivation, new expectations) around the often complex relationships found across 
potential (or actual) causes. Though the fishbone diagram originated in the field of 
management studies, it is now widely used in other fields, such as medicine, 
engineering, and the pure sciences, manufacturing science, computer science and IT. 
In medicine, it has been used to investigate the causes of infection (Frankel et al, 
2005); in the field of industrial engineering, it has been applied to analysing the 
direct and indirect factors involved in accident prevention (Chang and Lin, 2006); in 
information science, it is mainly applied to the development of computer software 
(Bjornson et al, 2009); for business market research, fishbone diagrams are a useful 
tool for analysis of product marketing strategies (Mazur, 1998). Advantages and 
disadvantages of Cause & Effect Diagram are shown below. 
Advantages; 
 Fishbone diagrams permit a thoughtful analysis that avoids overlooking any 
possible root causes for a need. 
 The fishbone technique is easy to implement and creates an 
easy‐to‐understand visual representation of the causes, categories of causes, 
and the need. 
 By using a fishbone diagram, you are able to focus the group on the ʺbig 
pictureʺ as to possible causes or factors influencing the problem/need. 
 Even after the need has been addressed, the fishbone diagram shows areas of 
weakness that ‐ once exposed ‐ can be rectified before causing more sustained 
difficulties. 
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Disadvantages; 
• The simplicity of a fishbone diagram can be both its strength and its 
weakness. As a weakness, the simplicity of the fishbone diagram may make it 
difficult to represent the truly interrelated nature of problems and causes in 
some very complex situations. 
• Unless you have an extremely large space on which to draw and develop the 
fishbone diagram, you may find that you are not able to explore the cause and 
effect relationships in as much detail as you would like to (Gupta et al., 
2007). 
2.2.2 Pareto Analysis  
 
The Pareto analysis, which is also known as 80-20 rule, is named after Italian 
economist Vilfredo Pareto . The principle states that for many events, roughly 80% 
of the effects/problems come from 20% of the causes (Surhone et al., 2010). It is a 
type of chart that contains both bars and a line graph, where individual values are 
represented in descending order by bars, and the cumulative total is represented by 
the line. This technique helps the users to identify the top causes that need to be 
addressed to resolve 80% of the problem. A Pareto Chart is a series of bars whose 
heights reflect the frequency or impact of problems. The bars are arranged in 
descending order of height from left to right. This means that the categories 
represented by the tall bars on the left are relatively more significant than those on 
the right. This bar chart is used to separate the “vital few” from the “trivial many”.  
How to Use the Tool; 
 Step 1: Identify and List Problems – First, write a list of all of the problems 
that you need to resolve. Where possible, talk to clients and team members to 
get their input, and draw on surveys, helpdesk logs and suchlike, where these 
are available.  
 Step 2: Identify the Root Cause of Each Problem – For each problem, identify 
its fundamental cause. (Techniques such as Brainstorming, the 5 Whys, 
Cause and Effect Analysis, and Root Cause Analysis will help with this.)  
 Step 3: Score Problems – Now you need to score each problem. The scoring 
method you use depends on the sort of problem you're trying to solve. For 
example, if you're trying to improve profits, you might score problems on the 
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basis of how much they are costing you. Alternatively, if you're trying to 
improve customer satisfaction, you might score them on the basis of the 
number of complaints eliminated by solving the problem.  
 Step 4: Group Problems Together by Root Cause – Next, group problems 
together by cause. For example, if three of your problems are caused by lack 
of staff, put these in the same group 
 Step 5: Add up the Scores for Each Group – You can now add up the scores 
for each cause group. The group with the top score is your highest priority, 
and the group with the lowest score is your lowest priority.  
 Step 6: Take Action – Now you need to deal with the causes of your 
problems, dealing with your top-priority problem or group of problems first. 
Keep in mind that low scoring problems may not be worth bothering with; 
solving these problems may cost you more than the solutions are worth (url 
4).  
2.3 Cognitive Mapping 
 
Cognitive maps are directed graphs used in understanding and capturing the cause-
effect relationships in complex causal systems and facilitate to understand the 
interconnections within the elements of the systems. Cognitive mapping technique is 
a popular technique in investigating individuals` cognitive representations in 
strategic decision making. (Hodgkinson et.al, 2004). Eden and Ackerman, (1998) 
define cognitive mapping as a technique designed to capture the thinking of an 
individual about a particular issue or problem in a diagrammatic format. The map 
also reveals how the elements of the issues relate to each other and how changes in 
the character of one element may have effects on another. Similar to Eden and 
Ackerman’s (1998) definition, Tegarden and Sheetz (2003) define cognitive mapping 
as a technique that captures the individuals’ view of a particular issue in a graphical 
representation. Özesmi and Özesmi (2004) define cognitive map as a qualitative 
model of how a given system operates and state that they are especially applicable 
and useful tools for modelling complex relationships among variables.  
 
A cognitive map approach ensures participations of the decision makers’ motivation 
through creative decision-making. In addition, it is an active tool, which allows 
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modification of dynamic attributes in problem environment in accordance with the 
prior settings and goal. (Çelik, 2010) Cognitive map was utilized by Axelrod (1976) 
for political analysis and decision making.  
 
It has been used widely by researchers in a variety of different contexts such as 
management and administrative sciences (Eden, 1992; Eden et al, 1992; Langfield- 
Smith and Wirth, 1992; Clarke and Mackaness, 2001; Ross and Hall, 1980; and 
Diffenbach, 1993), game theory (Klein and Cooper, 1982), information analysis 
(Montezemi and Conrath, 1986), popular political developments (Taber, 1991), 
analysing political decisions (Hart, 1977), electrical circuits analysis (Styblinski and 
Meyer, 1988), decision analysis (Zhang et al 1989), a distributed decision process 
model in the internet domain (Zhang et al 1994), the process of way-finding (Chen 
and Stanney, 1999), IS/IT project risk management (Al-Shehab et al, 2005), business 
process redesign (Kwahk and Kim, 1999), new product development (Carbonara and 
Scozzi, 2006), knowledge management (Noh et al, 2000), online community 
voluntary behaviour (Kang et al, 2007), Bosphorus crossing problem (Ulengin et al, 
2001), design of electronic commerce web sites (Lee and Lee, 2003), modeling the 
strategy building process (Carlsson and Fuller, 1996), and modelling IT projects 
success (Rodriguez-Repiso et al, 2007). 
 
Generally, the basic elements of a cognitive map are simple. The concepts an 
individual uses are represented as points, and the causal relationships between these 
concepts are represented as arrows between these points. This representation gives a 
graph of points and arrows, called a cognitive map. The strategic alternatives, all of 
the various causes and effects, goals and the ultimate utility of the decision-making 
agent can all be considered as concept variables, and represented as points in the 
causal map. Causal relationships can take on basic values + (such as promotes, 
enhances, helps, is benefit to, etc.), - (such as retards, hurts, prevents, is harmful to, 
etc.) and 0 (such as has no effect on, does not matter for, etc.). With this 
representation, it is then relatively easy to see how concepts and causal relationships 
are related to each other and to see the overall causal relationships of one concept 
with another. (Chaib-Draa & Desharnais, 1998)  
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3. APPLICATION 
3.1 Scope 
In this part, analytical and systematical analysis of the ISPS Code from quality 
perspective by using Fishbone Diagram (Ishikawa Diagram) and Pareto Chart 
techniques and brainstorming sessions for quality defect prevention in order to 
identify potential factors causing an overall effect process has done. Fish-bone 
diagram is prepared to illustrate the problems effecting the ISPS Code’s 
implementation and Pareto charts are prepared for all the criteria to identify major 
causes in implementation of the ISPS Code. Finally, Cognitive mapping method is 
used to determine the relationship between the causes and sub causes which was 
identified in Fish-bone diagram to see how the causes and sub causes affect each 
other. The path during this study is shown in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3. 1 : Path of the study. 
24 
3.2 Assesment of the ISPS Code via Fish-bone Diagram 
In this study “Security Breaches and Incidents for Ports” is determined as main 
problem in fish head. Through brain-storming sessions academic researches; and 
literature review; Risk Management Process, Security Awareness, Standardization, 
Monitoring and Surveillance Process, Training and Vessel Types are determined as 
the causes affecting main problem during implementation procedure of the ISPS 
Code. Figure 3.2 shows the fishbone diagram, which represents the main causes for 
all six aspects of analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 : Fishbone diagram of “Security Breaches and Incidents for Ports”. 
 
3.2.1 Training 
The program of IMO model training courses developed out of suggestions from a 
number of IMO Member Governments, following the adoption of the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for 
Seafarers, (STCW), 1978, as amended. Assisted by contributions from various 
Governments, IMO has designed the series of courses to help implement this 
Convention and, further, to facilitate access to the knowledge and skills demanded 
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by increasingly sophisticated maritime technology. The courses are flexible in 
application: maritime institutes and their teaching staff can use them in organizing 
and introducing new courses or in enhancing, updating or supplementing existing 
training material.  The model courses each include a course framework (detailing the 
scope, objective, entry standards, and other information about the course), a course 
outline (timetable), a detailed teaching syllabus (including the learning objectives 
that should have been achieved when the course has been completed by students), 
and guidance notes for the instructor and a summary of how students should be 
evaluated.  
The list of the IMO Model Courses related to ISPS Code is; 
• Model Course 3.19 - Ship Security Officer,  
• Model Course 3.20 - Company Security Officer,  
• Model Course 3.21 - Port Facility Security Officer,  
• Model Course 3.22 - Flag State,  
• Model Course 3.23 - Actions to be taken to Prevent Acts of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery,  
• Model Course 3.24 - Security Awareness Training with DSD,  
• Model Course 3.25 - Security Awareness Training for All Port Facility 
Personnel, 
• Model Course 3.26 - Security Training for Seafarers with Designated 
Security Duties  
• Model Course 3.27 - Security Awareness Training for All Seafarers 
The Global Program on ISPS implementation was launched in 2002. By the end of 
2005, 22 regional seminars/workshops and 87 national training courses/advisory 
missions have been organized, resulting in some 4.000 people being trained globally 
(url 5). Despite these numbers; the academicians and port security managers stated 
that the ISPS training level was not in an expected level. There is no standardization 
in training of ISPS implementation neither in different nations nor different courses 
in same nations. So, training has been identified as another major cause for Security 
Breaches and Incidents for ports. During our brainstorming sessions RSO’s 
complained about the unsatisfied level of ISPS training program. The training 
courses are carried out under different curriculums. That’s why lack of standard 
curriculum is detected as one of the sub-causes. All countries set their course 
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program according to their risk assessment and experiences. Hence, the ISPS Code’s 
training curriculum varies regionally. IMO has to examine the course program and 
establish a generally accepted curriculum and compel the governments to put into 
force these courses. Deficiencies in training are not limited with curriculum. The 
instructors’ experiences are also important. To take the control of security breaches, 
well-educated instructors are in need. That’s why; universally accepted certificate 
program can be put into force for instructors. Thus, they will have an internationally 
recognized certification and will be in satisfied information level all over the world. 
But education problem goes on with contracting government’s personnel. 
Contracting governments are not only a signature station.  They are responsible for 
implementing of ISPS Code and they have to realize the significance of this code. 
For regular implementation governments’ personnel (Designated authorities) have to 
be included in the course program.  
3.2.2 Standardization  
For a successful security management use of technological devices and equipment is 
very important. But, port authorities are complaining about the standardization 
because the ISPS Code does not oblige the use of any security devices and mention 
standards for them. The ISPS Code set some rules, but in some cases, it is unable to 
clarify the standards, especially during the process of determining technological 
devices using in ports and physical security standard. These non-standard 
applications induce to some vague areas, especially in port security management 
systems and physical security issues such as the number of security personnel. Most 
terminals are operating under tight financial and competing conditions and need to 
make a profit. The result is that the incentive for security is minimal and in many 
cases a non-effective security operation is put in place just for show. In some ports, 
port managers try to keep the number of security personnel in limited numbers due to 
financial restrictions. Therefore, surveillance and controlling the port area become 
difficult. When the issue is evaluated from this perspective, the need of setting new 
standard emerges about the standardization of security personnel depending on the 
traffic intensity and area size of the port. The vague areas on physical security issues 
are not limited with security personnel numbers. Fencing is another problem. 
Designated authorities and also ports experiences problems regarding fences type. A 
fence is often described as the first line of defence. However the level of protection 
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offered will depend on a number of variables, including the size and layout of the 
area that needs protecting, the height required, the construction, material used and 
any other security extras which may need to be added on to the perimeter. The same 
problem arises concerning the technological devices. The importance of technology 
on maintaining security is known. There are some initiatives that mega ports put in 
force such as CSI and C-TPAT but no mandatory devices mentioned in ISPS Code 
like CCTV, fingerprint, X-ray scan, facial recognition, underwater security devices 
and etc. As a result, we detected in our searches that, the need of review emerges 
about the use of technological devices and physical security standard by evaluating 
the security and cost analysis.  
3.2.3 Monitoring and surveillance process 
Monitoring and surveillance has been identified as another major cause because 
many security breaches occur due to surveillance and monitoring process 
deficiencies. Being able to control the movement of the inner harbor could minimize 
the possible security threats. That’s why seaside, underwater, access control and 
container security are important problems. Especially, container security becomes 
more important with each passing day. Unlike tankers, container vessels are more 
likely to be used as a tool for the delivery of terrorist weaponry rather than as the 
subject of an attack. Millions of containers arrive in Europe, Japan, and the United 
States each year, and each could potentially contain explosives, biological agents, or 
weapons of mass destruction (Goh, 2006). The United States has developed 
unilateral initiatives to address cargo security, including the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) and the Customs–Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C–TPAT). 
These initiatives target security measures along the entire supply chain, thereby 
expanding the more narrow focus of the ISPS. These initiatives may very well 
provide a model for the WCO in developing internationally binding cargo security 
measures (Ran, 2005).  
But the problem is not limited only with container security. Controlling the port area 
is another cause which consists of seaside, underwater and access control. Seaside 
control and underwater control is important from the perspective of terrorism and 
sabotage. The land-based section of maritime security can be divided into two main 
parts: Port & Terminal protection and Shore & Waterway protection. Of course the 
shores and waterways reach the ports and terminals, but because of the difference in 
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the environment and the extensiveness of the areas the solutions are very different 
(Kahn, 2003). Terrorist can use sea side in case of any control deficiency. Therefore, 
some technological measures could be put into practice to prevent any possible 
attack.  Remotely operated vehicle (ROV) is a robotic system for underwater 
operation. ROVs vary in size and configuration, e.g., number and type of cameras, 
mechanical tools, presence of sonar and other sensors. There are a number of 
commercially available ROVs specifically designed for harbor security (Ferriere et 
al., 2005). Another solution method could be using the diver. This is not exact 
solution but can be preferred depending on financial conditions of port facility. 
 Access control is also another sub-cause. This problem can be solved by using 
devices like fingerprint, face recognition and CCTV system. An access control 
deficiency was experienced in the case of Kartepe Ferry’s hijacking. The passenger 
vessels transport millions of people in a day so the access points of ferry’s ports are 
easy to enter for professional terrorists. 
Gate access control is the simplest to achieve, and operates by checking the identity 
of people entering the port and giving a temporary access pass. But it remains 
essential to also physically check the vehicles entering and leaving to make sure that 
no “extra” people enter the terminal. This costs extra manpower and effort, but 
without it, access control is meaningless. The tools to be used can vary from simple 
ID cards to smart cards and biometric cards (Kahn, 2003). Each person entering the 
port should be issued an identification badge. The ID badge program should be 
managed by a computer-based system which functions with proximity or magnetic 
strip badges, assigns zones of access, permits or denies a person’s access into a 
specific zone, and records this activity into a data base. The front of the employee ID 
badge should have a colour photo, the employee’s name and signature, government 
identity document or passport number, position, and an expiration date. The back of 
the ID card should note the employee’s date of birth, height, weight, colour of hair 
and eyes, complexion, and the signature of the Port Director. Each employee’s badge 
should be programmed to allow access to specific zones; this being based on his/her 
job or position requirements. Employees who have forgotten or lost their badges 
should be issued a “temporary badge” for the day or while a new badge is being 
prepared. Visitor badges generally are for “one-day use”, disposable, and should note 
the name of the visitor, government identity document or passport number, area or 
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zones visiting, and the date issued. Non-employees who temporarily or frequently 
work in the port - such as contractors, clients, and government representatives - 
should be issued a badge similar to the employee ID badge (but a different colour). A 
permanent record of the issue all non-employee badges (with the captured data) 
should be maintained for at least two years. Alternatively, if financially possible, 
container X-ray stations should be positioned at the vehicle and container entrance 
points to screen for narcotics. Special attention should be given to suspicious mail 
and delivery packages and unattended vehicles positioned at access points or near 
key assets or buildings (McNicholas, 2002). 
When considering shore and waterway protection one must first clarify what the 
threats are. In many cases the sinking of a ship in narrow waterways can disrupt 
traffic for a long period of time, causing major economic damage. Sinking an oil 
tanker and causing an oil spill will add an ecological (and further financial) 
dimension to the attack. Another threat may be the landing of illegal’s or even 
terrorists on the shores. Since shores cannot be closed with fences, and the public 
normally demands free access to them, it is necessary to intercept such operations 
before they are able to land ashore (McNicholas, 2002). 
The number of port entrances and exits should be limited to a minimum and their 
purposes specifically defined. There should be separate gates for pedestrians and 
vehicles. Likewise, there should be separate gates for the entrance and exit of trucks 
transporting containers/cargo and those vehicles driven by employees, vendors, 
clients, and visitors. Physically, the gates should be constructed so as to meet the 
same minimum standards as the chain link perimeter barrier. These gates should lock 
with heavy-duty padlocks and the keys controlled by security personnel. A security 
gatehouse should be located at each primary access point. The gate house should 
have the basic items required to accomplish the tasks, such as a fire extinguisher, 
first aid kit, flashlight, rain gear, vehicle and visitor gate logs, 24-hour chronological 
security logbook, personnel authorization roster, telephone, emergency telephone 
notification list, security post orders, and a copy of the Emergency Action Plan. (MC 
Nicholas, 2002) 
All access points (gates) into the port should be strictly controlled and there should 
be a comprehensive policy and specific written procedures which define the access 
of persons (employees, visitors, contractors, truck drivers, ship chandlers, etc.), 
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vehicles (employee and visitor cars, trucks, etc.), and items (cargo, containers, 
trailers, ship’s goods, spare parts, etc.) into and out of the port. “Authorized 
Personnel only”, “Identification Checkpoint” and “Subject to Search upon Entry and 
Exit” signs should be posted and highly visible at all access points. Security officers 
posted at pedestrian gates should stop and challenge all persons, inspect their 
identification badges, and search any boxes, briefcases, or other items for 
contraband. Employees should present their ID badges to the security officer upon 
entrance and exit and wear their badges at all times while in the port. All visitors 
(clients, vendors, contractors, etc.) should be stopped at the gate, their visit 
confirmed with the sponsoring port employee, a temporary badge issued and visitor 
log completed, and any items opened and inspected for contraband. The interior and 
trunks of all vehicles should be visually checked for contraband. No privately-owned 
vehicles should be permitted inside the terminal. All trucks entering the cargo gates 
should be stopped, the driver’s license checked for validity, the cab inspected for 
contraband and unauthorized persons, container seals inspected, and relevant 
information recorded on a comprehensive gate log (McNicholas, 2002). 
3.2.4 Security awareness 
Security awareness is vital to the safety, security and health of port personnel and 
others having a place of work in the port, which should be made aware of their 
responsibilities to fellow workers, the port community and the environment. 
Appropriate training of personnel working in the port should maximize personal 
awareness of suspicious behaviour, incidents, events or objects when going about 
daily tasks, and the invaluable contribution to be made to the security of the port and 
its personnel by each individual. Security awareness has been identified as another 
major cause for Security Breaches and Incidents ports. During the interviews with 
port authorities and recent academic researches; we detected two main sub-causes 
about security awareness. Lack of accidents/breaches statistics is the first part. Lots 
of ports and ships do not report the accidents or any security breaches especially 
comparing with other subjects relating to the shipping such as statistic of non-
conformities during the inspections, near miss reporting, vessels performances, etc. 
That’s why, a question; “Do the statistics give reliable information?” emerges. 
Unless the authorities can detect the security breaches and incidents, evaluation of 
the ISPS Code cannot be done in a reliable manner. Hence, security awareness notion 
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must be mentioned in all areas regarding the ISPS Code and security. In the second 
sub-cause of this part; lack of sharing experience and feedbacks was detected. 
Sharing information is significant to prevent security breaches. Historical part of 
security and every type of experience must be shared. And also this notion can be put 
into the ISPS Code courses’ curriculum.  
3.2.5 Vessel types 
Given the role small vessels have played in the tragic 2000 attack on the USS Cole, 
and the apparent maritime link to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, it is understandable that 
in recent years attention have turned to small vessel security. The Strategy identified 
the following four scenarios of greatest concern that small vessels could pose in 
terrorist-related attacks (url 6): 
1. Domestic use of waterborne improvised explosive devices  
2. Conveyance for smuggling weapons (including weapons of mass destruction)  
3. Conveyance for smuggling terrorists; and 
4. Waterborne platform for conducting a stand-off attack  
It would be relatively easy for a terrorist organization to acquire or commandeer a small 
vessel to conduct a terrorist attack. Another major concern was that, depending on the 
target, terrorists would be more likely to acquire small vessels to be used in terrorist 
attacks from foreign countries to other countries. Terrorists have demonstrated their 
intention to use small vessels to harm U.S. interests. For example, on October 12, 2000, 
the USS COLE was attacked by al-Qaida suicide bombers using a small vessel loaded 
with explosives while she was harboured in the Yemeni port of Aden. The resulting 
explosion killed 17 sailors and injured 39 others. Moreover, the use of a small vessel as a 
platform for conducting a stand-off attack cannot be discounted. In August 2005, 
terrorists fired rockets at two U.S. warships docked in Aqaba, Jordan. While in that case 
the platform was a local warehouse, pirates have also used small vessels as a platform 
for stand-off attacks. In November 2005, a cruise liner was attacked by two 25-foot rigid 
hull inflatable boats 100 miles off the coast of Somalia. The pirates used rocket-
propelled grenades and automatic weapons, and were repelled by the crew of the 
passenger vessel M/V SEABOURN SPIRIT using a sonic blast, and by increasing to full 
speed and outrunning the pirates (url 6). The problem at that point is detection of the 
small vessels. Small crafts packed with explosives are very effective in their attacks, as 
demonstrated in the attacks on the USS Cole and the M/V Limburg (Murphy, 2008).  
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Small crafts are possibly threats for ports due to their size and high speed. The results 
of an attack by a speed craft filled with bombs to a port which stationed in the 
metropolis can be very painful. That’s why the academicians and port authorities pay 
attention to the detection of small vessels. Their negative impact is proved several 
times. Therefore, fishing vessels are also important in this type. This was clearly 
demonstrated in the Mumbai attack when the attackers arrived in a hijacked fishing 
trawler (Goh, 2006). As a result, we can mention that small vessels are a sub cause of 
“vessel type” problem and possible threats for ports.  
 
3.2.6 Risk Management 
In the past, safety management and regulation was usually introduced as a result of 
an accident/incident or a series of accidents/incidents. It has now become necessary 
to take a proactive approach toward safety that aims to identify risks and then to 
control them. This has to be undertaken in a way that constantly updates 
identification and mitigation of risks in any process or organization. In marine 
organizations interfacing with or influencing marine operations this has never been 
more important, due to the very high cost and wider implications of maritime 
accidents (url 7). 
The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 provide a good illustration of the 
challenges facing states and metropolitan areas in preparing for and responding to 
unexpected security incidents or natural disasters. Given the suddenness of the 
terrorist incidents and their unexpected nature, it is not surprising that there was 
some confusion and lack of coordination in managing the transportation system in 
the aftermath. One lesson from September 11th is paramount—effective coordination 
and communication among the many different operating agencies in a region and 
across the nation is absolutely essential.  Such coordination is needed to allow 
enforcement/security/safety responses to occur in an expeditious manner, while at the 
same time still permitting the transportation system to handle the possibly 
overwhelming public response to the incident.  Complementary to this is the need to 
make sure the public has clear and concise information about the situation and what 
actions they should take.  The September 11, 2001 terrorist incidents have focused 
attention on large scale, area wide responses to sudden terrorist incidents. There is a 
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wide range of such incidents that could cause varying levels of disruption to the 
transportation system (Mayer, 2008).   
In fishbone diagram, six generic headings are created to prompt ideas. According to 
our research “Risk Management Process” is detected as one of the six causes. In our 
interviews and brainstorming sessions, we realized that most of the academicians and 
port authorities pay attention to risk management problem. They believe that a risk 
management which carried out in an intelligent way can solve most of the problems. 
But, risk profiles vary regionally. The problem begins at that point. Threats consist of 
internal and external effects which change depending on social and political effects. 
The port managers and security personnel must be wise and well-educated to 
evaluate the possible risks in a correct way by paying attention both internal and 
external effects. When the topic is evaluated from the context of ISPS 
implementations, it is noticed that ISPS Code is only guidance to assess these threats 
and take suitable measures against any of them. ISPS Code determines the frame for 
assessing and managing risks changing all around the world. Therefore, standard 
applications for all nations which are in different regions are suggested by ISPS. This 
is another sub-cause. In brief; different threats but standard applications. For 
example, the Port of Rotterdam focuses primarily on the dangers of terrorist attacks 
on containers or mass goods (such as oil), while the Port of New Orleans has faced 
natural disaster (e.g. hurricane Katrina) and its consequences (Wenning et al., 2007). 
At that point, countries fell them under threat and produce their own solutions. 
Australia, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand, for example, have legislated new 
measures to strengthen their cargo security programmes in line with American 
security standards, for example the Container Security Initiative (Peterson & Treat, 
2008). On a European level, American security standards are integrated by the EU’s 
Authorized Economic Operator (AEO), almost entirely similar to the American 
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) (Url 8). As a result, we can 
mention that threats vary both internally and externally according to regions but 
applications are standard in all regions. Therefore, the duties of contracting 
governments begin at that point. To access and manage the possible risks, well-
educated and experienced security personnel need is obvious. Governments also have 
to assess and manage risks with balancing financial limitations. Financial limitations 
prevent to make a risk management and security in a successful way. But, every 
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government must meet up to the expectations of the IMO, and ports have thus 
become barometers of security, to be subject to unannounced inspections by Port 
State Control and to Port Facility Security Assessments (George & Whatford, 2007). 
But, vague regulations and suggestions about risk management compel governments 
to execute their own initiatives. Hence, the applications can be different in the same 
region and states produce their own solutions to security breaches. According to 
Pedersen (Pedersen, 2010), different principles must be used to formulate risk criteria 
depending on the nature of the consequence in question. For example, there must be 
a special focus on incidents with several fatalities because society considers these 
incidents more severe than multiple incidents with few fatalities. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the risks associated with ship security, that is, piracy and 
other types of crime at sea, require specific risk criteria as the consequences (possible 
great human suffering and multiple fatalities) that are incomparable with the 
traditional operational risks encountered in shipping. According to NATO, security 
measures are used not only to minimize the vulnerability of personnel and material 
but also to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness (NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2007).  
 Some examples of Risk Assessment Management Systems & Methods and security 
initiatives are given below: 
3.2.6.1 AS/NZ 4300-1990 port & harbour risk assessment and safety 
management systems in New Zealand 
According to this system; the assestment has to start with identification of hazards. 
Once a hazard is identified, frequency ((likelihood, probability or chance) of a hazard 
realisation) and consequence ((severity or impact) of the hazard reaching its 
potential) data can be added, the result is risk. It is beneficial for a regional council or 
port company to adopt this approach as it provides answers to determine the priority 
of risk control within the harbour or port. This allows a Port and Harbour Safety 
Management System to be introduced in manageable stages, concentrating first on 
those defenses which control higher risks.  
Risk assessment techniques are fundamentally the same for large or small ports or 
harbours, although the execution and detail will vary considerably. For a large port or 
harbour, the task is large and, if done to a sufficient level of detail, complex. It is thus 
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much better to insert a structure through the whole assessment from the beginning 
and carve the work needed into manageable packages. In a port or harbour risk 
assessment, the following five stages are appropriate: 
 Stage 1 Data Gathering and System Assessment 
 Stage 2 Hazard Identification (HAZID Meeting) 
 Stage 3 Risk Analyses 
 Stage 4 Assessment of existing risk management strategies, development of 
new measures; Assessment of Control Adequacy Rating 
 Stage 5 Managing and Treating the Risk via the Port and Harbour Safety 
Management System. 
3.2.6.2 The threat and risk analysis matrix (TRAM) 
The threat and risk analysis matrix (TRAM) is a simplified risk-based method and 
tool to assist in carrying out a port security assessment (PSA).  Its purpose is to 
identify threats with a view to initiating and recommending countermeasures to 
deter, detect and reduce the consequences of any potential incident, should it occur. 
In addition to the more obvious threats, the list of potential targets should be as 
comprehensive as possible with due regard to the function(s) of the port, legal, 
political, social, geographic and economic environment of the country, and the 
security environment specific to the port. 
3.2.6.3 The container security initiative 
The globalization of the world economy and the increasing threat of terrorism have 
placed pressure on the world's governments, especially Customs administrations. 
Merchants have demanded faster, more standardized and uniform service while 
governments require more revenues and more secure borders. At the same time 
Customs must produce trade statistics and enforce other agency laws (i.e. health, 
intellectual property, etc.) at the nation's border. Customs are faced with the prospect 
of balancing the requirement of facilitation with the increased importance of security 
enforcement as a consequence to the emerging terrorist threats. To deal with security 
threats posed by container shipping, The US Custom Service is proposed The 
Container Security Initiative to identify high-risk containers and secure them with 
tamper-detection systems. The initiative aims to expedite processing of containers 
pre-screened at points of embarkation in overseas mega ports participating in the 
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initiative (Stanford, 2003). The US CSI consists of four core elements (Banomyong, 
2005). These are: 
1. to establish security criteria to identify high risk containers; 
2. to pre-screen those ocean going containers identified as high risk before 
they arrive at US ports; 
3. to use advance technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers; 
4. to develop the use of smart and secure ocean going containers. 
3.2.6.4 The customs trade partnership against terrorism 
C-TPAT is a US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) voluntary joint government-
business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen overall supply 
chain and border security. C-TPAT recognizes that Customs can provide the highest 
level of security only through close cooperation with the ultimate owners of the 
supply chain, importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse operators, and manufacturers. 
This initiative asks that business work to ensure the integrity of their supply chain 
processes and business partners, and successfully maintain open communication of 
their status (url 9).  
3.2.6.5 Operation safe commerce 
OSC funds pilot programs that are meant to enhance and complement other security 
initiatives, such as C-TPAT and CSI, by testing technologies and business processes 
that protect commercial shipments from tampering all along the supply chain, from 
point of origin to point of destination. For a project to be funded, it must accomplish 
one or more of the following tasks to secure the supply chain: 
 Validate security at the point of origin, to include the security of the shipment 
itself and the information that describes it; 
 Secure the supply chain from the point of origin to its final destination and all 
the points in between; and Monitor the movement and integrity of the cargo 
while in transit using available technology (Haveman, 2005). 
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3.3 Assessment of the ISPS Code via Pareto Analysis 
In this paper, Pareto charts were prepared for all the criteria to identify major causes 
in implementation of the ISPS Code. After the causes were found via Fishbone 
Diagram, questionnaire was prepared in order to identify major causes. In the 
questionnaire; academicians, port authorities and ship masters were asked about the 
evaluation of problems regarding quality of the ISPS Code such as Risk 
Management, Security Awareness, Standardization, Vessel Type, Training and 
Monitoring & Surveillance Process. In the questionnaire the participants graded the 
causes to 1 to 6 point according to importance level. The most important cause point 
was 6. It decreased one by one up to one that was defined as most trivial cause.  The 
results of the questionnaire regarding the importance level of causes of deficiencies 
are shown in the table 3.1. 
After graphing the marks, table 3.1 was constituted. The percentages and the 
cumulative percentage which would be helpful to find the breakpoints was calculated 
and indicated in the below table.  
Table 3.1 : The pareto analysis of “Security Breaches and Incidents for Ports”. 
Causes 
Resultsof 
Questionnaire 
Percentages 
 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Training 207 25,2 25,2 
Security Awareness 171 20,8 46,1 
Risk Management 156 19,04 65,2 
Standardization 150 18,31 83,5 
Monitoring and Surveillance  96 11,7 95,2 
Vessel Types 39 4,76 100 
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Figure 3.3 : The results of the questionnaire - bar chart. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 : The pareto analysis - bar chart and line chart. 
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Figure 3.5 : The pareto analysis - bar chart and line chart. 
As seen in the diagrams, there are 2 break points in the cumulative percentage line. 
These points occur when the scope of the line begins to flatten out. The factors under 
the steepest part of the curve are the most important. Hence, training has the most 
significance level compared to other causes. Security awareness, risk management 
and standardization have approximately same importance level and more important 
when compared to the monitoring & surveillance process and vessel types. 
According to break points; monitoring & surveillance process and vessel types have 
the lesser significance level compared to the causes in left side which is illustrated in 
figure 3.4 and figure 3.5 respectively. 
3.4 Assessment of the ISPS Code via Cognitive Mapping 
Cognitive-mapping method is used to determine the relationship between the causes 
and sub causes which was identified in Fish-bone diagram to see how the causes and 
sub causes affect each other. 
3.4.1 Analysing of the causes of security breaches and incidents for ports  
When the Risk management process (Cause A), which is determined one of the main 
cause of Security Breaches for Port, analysed; its sub-causes as follows: Different 
threats both internally and externally, Standard applications in all regions, Individual 
initiatives of contracting governments 
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Table 3.2 : Cause A: risk management process. 
 
A1= Different threats both internally and externally 
A2= Standard applications in all regions 
A3= Individually initiatives of contracting governments 
 
When the Security awareness (Cause B), which is determined one of the main cause 
of Security Breaches for Port, analysed; its sub-causes as follows: Lack of accidents / 
breaches statistics, Lack of sharing of experience and feedbacks 
Table 3.3: Cause B: security awareness. 
 
B1= Lack of accidents / breaches statistics 
B2= Lack of sharing of experience and feedbacks 
 
When the Standardization (Cause C), which is determined one of the main cause of 
Security Breaches for Port, analysed; its sub-causes as follows: Lack of technological 
devises, Physical security standards 
Table 3.4: Cause C :standardization. 
 
C1= Lack of technological devises 
C2= Physical security standards 
 
When the Vessel types (Cause D), which is determined one of the main cause of 
Security Breaches for Port, analysed; its sub-cause as follows: Small and fishing 
vessels inspection 
Table 3.5: Cause D: vessel types. 
 
D1= Small and fishing vessels inspection 
 
When the Training (Cause E), which is determined one of the main cause of Security 
Breaches for Port, analysed; its sub-cause as follows: Lack of curriculum, 
Government education, RSO expertise, Lack of security education 
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Table 3.6 : Cause E: training. 
E1= Lack of curriculum 
E2= Government education 
E3= RSO expertise 
E4= Lack of security education 
 
When the Monitoring and surveillance process (Cause F), which is determined one of 
the main cause of Security Breaches for Port, analysed; its sub-cause as follows: 
Passenger ship entrance, Container security, Access control, Sea side control 
Table 3.7 : Cause F: monitoring and surveillance process. 
F1= Passenger ship entrance 
F2= Container security 
F3= Access control 
F4= Sea side control 
3.4.2 Establishment of relationship matrix 
The cognitive map may be transformed into a matrix format and the relationships 
may be represented in this matrix called the “valency matrix”. The valency matrix A 
is a square matrix of n X n where n is the total number of concepts in the 
corresponding cognitive map. A is a signed matrix composing of the values (vij) 
representing the strength of the relations between the variables in the map. vij =1 If a 
positive relationship from i to j is present in the cognitive map, -1 if a negative 
relationship from i to j is present and 0 if the variables are unrelated. The diagonal 
elements in the map are considered to be 0. The valency matrix has a number of 
useful properties: The sum of the absolute values of the elements of a row i gives the 
outdegree (od) of concept i, that is, the number of concepts perceived to be affected 
directly by concept i. Similarly, the column sum of the absolute values of the 
elements of column i gives the indegree (id) of concept i, the number of concepts 
perceived to affect concept i directly. The sum of the indegree and outdegree for 
concept i gives the total degree (td) of concept i, a useful operational measure of the 
concept’s cognitive centrality in the decision maker’s belief structure (Nozicka et.al., 
1976). 
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3.4.3 Detection of centrality values for concepts 
Centrality of a concept is a measure in application of cognitive mapping approach. 
Centrality means a reference point to indicate the importance of a concept in a map 
(Eden et al., 1992). To compute the centrality, the row/column sums of the absolute 
values (means the direction of the links is ignored) of existing relations are 
principally considered (Çelik, 2010). Figure 3.6 gives the computed centrality values 
for each concept of the problem at hand.  
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 A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 C1 C2 D1 E1 E2 E3 E4 F1 F2 F3 F4 
A1  0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + + 
A2 -  0 0 0 - + 0 - + + - + + + + 
A3 - 0  0 0 - + + - + + - + + + + 
B1 0 0 0  + 0 0 0 + 0 - + 0 0 0 0 
B2 0 0 0 +  0 0 0 + 0 - + 0 0 0 0 
C1 + 0 0 0 0  - - + - - + - - - - 
C2 - 0 0 0 0 -  + - + + - + + + + 
D1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 
E1 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  - - + - - - - 
E2 - 0 + 0 0 0 0 + -  + - + + + + 
E3 - 0 + 0 0 0 0 + - +  - + + + + 
E4 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + - -  - - - - 
F1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 0  0 + 0 
F2 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + 0 0  + 0 
F3 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 + + 0 + +  + 
F4 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 + + 0 0 + +  
Figure 3.6 : Centrality values for concepts. 
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Centrality values for each 
concept 
Priority order of 
centrality values 
Causes Centrality 
values 
Causes Centrality 
values 
A1 18 E3 23 
A2 11 E2 21 
A3 15 F3 19 
B1 5 A1 18 
B2 5 E1 17 
C1 14 E4 17 
C2 14 F4 17 
D1 10 F2 15 
E1 17 A3 15 
E2 21 F1 14 
E3 23 C1 14 
E4 17 C2 14 
F1 14 A2 11 
F2 15 D1 10 
F3 19 B1 5 
F4 17 B2 5 
Figure 3.7 : Centrality values for each concept /Priority order of centrality values. 
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In the above table, six causes and sub causes of each, which have been found by 
fishbone diagram was applied to cognitive mapping method and their centrality 
values are determined. If we array each causes in itselves; 
The graphical representation of centrality values of the sub-causes of Cause A is 
shown in figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8: Centrality values of cause A. 
 
The graphical representation of centrality values of the sub-causes of Cause B is 
shown in figure 3.9. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 : Centrality values of cause B. 
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The graphical representation of centrality values of the sub-causes of Cause C is 
shown in figure 3.10. 
 
 
Figure 3.10 : Centrality values of cause C. 
 
Because of Cause D has only one sub-cause, no comparison can be done. 
The graphical representation of centrality values of the sub-causes of Cause E is 
shown in figure 3.11. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 : Centrality values of cause E. 
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The graphical representation of centrality values of the sub-causes of Cause F is 
shown in figure 3.12. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 : Centrality values of cause F. 
 
Furthermore, after analyzing the centrality values of six causes and sub causes of 
each in itselves, cognitive mapping technique is applied to find the casual 
relationship among all causes and sub causes. Below figures schematize the focused 
problem in accordance with the cognitive mapping principals. It is discussed for each 
cause separately from other causes. The blue lines show the negative casual relation 
(-) while the lines with red color indicate the positive casual relation (+). 
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Figure 3.13: Cognitive mapping of Isps Code implementation/Cause A. 
 
When the Cause A is analysed; centrality values of sub causes A1, A2 and A3 are 
respectively 18, 11 and 15.  
A1= Different threats both internally and externally 
A2= Standard applications in all regions 
A3= Individually initiatives of contracting governments 
If we approach the analysis in itself, A1 has the biggest importance in comparison 
with A3, and A3 is more important rather than A2. If we approach the analysis in 
whole sub causes A1 is the 4
th
 rank in among the 16 sub causes while A2 is the 13
th
 
and A1 is the 9
th
 rank.  
When cognitive mapping technique results and Pareto analysis results are compared 
with each other related to Cause A; results are compatible with the rank 3
rd
 among 6 
causes. 
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Figure 3.14 : Cognitive mapping of Isps Code implementation/Cause B. 
 
When the Cause B is analysed; sub causes B1 and B2 has the same centrality values 
with 5 and when compared with the whole sub causes in this study, Cause B is one of 
the least important according to the cognitive mapping diagram.  
B1= Lack of accidents / breaches statistics 
B2= Lack of sharing of experience and feedbacks 
When cognitive mapping technique results and Pareto analysis results are compared 
with each other related to Cause B; results are not compatible. While Cause B is the 
2
nd
 rank among 6 causes in Pareto analysis, it is the 6
th
 in cognitive mapping 
technique. In this case, we can say that even the security awareness in one of the 
most important reason that affect implementation of the ISPS Code, but not stimulate 
other causes. 
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Figure 3.15 : Cognitive mapping of Isps Code implementation/Cause C. 
 
When the Cause C is analysed; sub causes C1 and C2 has the same centrality values 
with 14 and when compared with the whole sub causes in this study, Cause B is the 
least important according to the cognitive mapping diagram.  
C1= Lack of technological devises 
C2= Physical security standards 
If we approach the analysis in itself, C1 and C2 have the same centrality values with 
14. When cognitive mapping technique results and Pareto analysis results are 
compared with each other related to Cause C; results are compatible with the rank 4
th
   
among 6 causes. 
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Figure 3.16 : Cognitive mapping of Isps Code implementation/Cause D. 
 
When the Cause D is analysed; its sub cause has centrality value with 10. When 
compared with the whole sub causes in this study, Cause D has very less importance 
according to the cognitive mapping diagram.  
D1= Small and fishing vessels inspection 
When cognitive mapping technique results and Pareto analysis results are compared 
with each other related to Cause D; results are compatible with the rank 5
th
 among 6 
causes in cognitive mapping techniques, and 6
th
 among 6 causes in Pareto analysis. 
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Figure 3.17 : Cognitive mapping of Isps Code implementation/Cause E. 
 
When the Cause E is analysed; centrality values of sub causes E1, E2, E3 and E4 are 
respectively 17, 21, 23 and 17. 
E1= Lack of curriculum 
E2= Government education 
E3= RSO expertise 
E4= Lack of security education 
If we approach the analysis in itself, E3 has the biggest importance in comparison 
with E2, and E2 is more important rather than E1 and E4. If we approach the analysis 
in whole sub causes E3 has the highest rank in among the 16 sub causes. 
When cognitive mapping technique results and Pareto analysis results are compared 
with each other related to Cause E; results are compatible with the rank 1st among 6 
causes. 
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Figure 3.18 : Cognitive mapping of Isps Code implementation/Cause F. 
 
When the Cause F is analysed; centrality values of sub causes F1, F2, F3 and F4 are 
respectively 14, 15, 19 and 17. 
F1= Passenger ship entrance 
F2= Container security 
F3= Access control 
F4= Sea side control 
If we approach the analysis in itself, F3 has the biggest importance in comparison 
with F4, and F4 is more important rather than F2 and F1.  
When cognitive mapping technique results and Pareto analysis results are compared 
with each other related to Cause F; results are not compatible. While Cause F is the 
2
nd
 rank among 6 causes in cognitive mapping technique, it is the 5
th
 in Pareto 
analysis. In this case, we can say that even the monitoring and surveillance process 
has less importance among other causes; it stimulates other causes to generation. 
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Comparison of the results from the highest priority to lowest priority is given at table 
3.8. 
Table 3.8 : Comparison of the results. 
Results via Pareto Analysis Results via Cognitive Mapping Technique 
1. Training 1. Training 
2. Security Awareness 2. Monitoring & 
Surveillance Process  
3. Risk Management 
Process 
3. Risk Management 
Process 
4. Standardization 4. Standardization 
5. Monitoring & 
Surveillance Process 
5. Security Awareness 
6. Vessel Types 6. Vessel Types 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade and a key engine driving 
globalization. Around 90 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent by 
value is carried by sea and is handled by ports worldwide. Twenty-four hours a day 
and all year round, ships carry cargoes to all corners of the globe.  This role will 
continue to grow with the anticipated increase in world trade in the years to come as 
millions of people are expected to be lifted out of poverty through improved access 
to basic materials, goods and products. World trade and maritime transport are, 
therefore, fundamental to sustaining economic growth and spreading prosperity 
throughout the world, thereby fulfilling a critical social as well as an economic 
function.  
Maritime transportation is carried out in water environment. Ports shape the start and 
the end point of this transportation. Most of the world trade conducted by maritime 
transport system manifests the particular importance of sea ports, which are an 
inseparable part of this transport, in terms of presence, necessity and economic 
activity. In addition to their commercial effects, sea ports have also strategic and 
socio-economic effects on their regions. Clearly, due to their effects on maritime 
trade, sea ports are the doors opening to the outside world and breathing points for a 
country. Ports, ferry and liner terminals are usually established in crowded regions 
where many people live and work. Every day, billions of cargos and thousands of 
people go in and out of ports all around the world. Ports, which are the doors of 
countries opening to the outside world, can become targets for terrorist groups 
seeking a global impact. Because of transnational flows of goods and people; ports 
and maritime transport has been exposed to several types of security threats. Piracy, 
robbery attacks, terrorist attacks, illegal migrations, smuggling, human and drug 
trafficking are the most noticeable threats.  In this sense, security management 
cannot be left aside from the installation and operating processes of ports. Since 
maritime transportation generates the backbone of the world trade, effective and 
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applicable security measures are needed to ensure that the international transport 
system is protected from the acts of above mentioned threats. 
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is a 
comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, 
developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The ISPS Code is implemented through 
chapter XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime security in the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974.
 
Both SOLAS Chapter XI-2 
and ISPS Code entered into force on the 1 July 2004.Although introduction of the 
ISPS Code have significantly reduced maritime attacks by terrorists since 1 July 
2004, recent security breaches and incidents have shown that ISPS Code did not 
provide desired level of security neither for ships nor port facilities. 
In this study “Security Breaches and Incidents for Ports” is determined as main 
problem. Fish-bone diagram is prepared to illustrate the problems effecting the ISPS 
Code’s implementation. Through brain-storming sessions, academic researches; and 
literature review; Risk Management Process, Security Awareness, Standardization, 
Monitoring and Surveillance Process, Training and Vessel Types are determined as 
the causes affecting main problem during implementation procedure of the ISPS 
Code in fishbone diagram technique. 
After the causes that affect the ISPS Code’s implementation had been determined, 
Pareto analysis prepared for all the criteria to identify major causes in 
implementation of the ISPS Code. Questionnaire was prepared in order to identify 
major causes. In the questionnaire; academicians, port authorities and ship masters 
were asked about the evaluation of problems regarding quality of the ISPS Code such 
as Risk Management, Security Awareness, Standardization, Vessel Type, Training 
and Monitoring & Surveillance Process. According to Pareto analysis; training was 
found as the most significant factor compared to other causes. Security awareness, 
risk management and standardization have approximately same importance level 
when compared to the monitoring & surveillance process and vessel types. As a 
cause vessel types is the least important cause that affect implementation of the ISPS 
Code according to the Pareto analysis. 
Finally, Cognitive Mapping method is used to find how the causes and their sub-
causes (which have already found via fishbone diagram) affect anothers’ and to see 
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the causal relationship between each other. Centrality values are found and ordered 
from highest to lowest. According to this method, training is the most important 
cause of the problem that affects implementation of the ISPS Code. If the causes are 
arranged by the importance level respectively; training, monitoring & surveillance, 
risk management, standardization, vessel types and security awareness follow this 
order.  
Training is the most important cause in both Pareto analysis and Cognitive mapping 
technique. While security awareness is the  second rank in Pareto analysis, it has 
least importance level in cognitive mapping technique. In such a case, we can say 
that even the security awareness is one of the most important reason that affect 
implementation of the ISPS Code, it has no  stimulating effect on  other causes. In 
the analysis of the  causes of risk management, standardization and vessel types; it is 
seen that results found via Pareto analysis and cognitive mapping are compatible. On 
the other hand, in the analysis of   the cause of monitoring and surveillance,  which  
has less importance level in Pareto analysis, we see that it is in the  second rank 
among 6 causes in cognitive mapping technique. In that case, we can say that it 
stimulates other causes. 
In conclusion, the following suggestions were developed for the enhanced 
implementation of the ISPS Code to increase the effectiveness of maritime transport 
system from management level perspective: 
1. IMO has to examine the course program and establish a generally accepted 
curriculum and compel contracting governments to put into force these 
courses.  
2. Contracting governments must increase the inspections on national ISPS 
Code training courses. 
3. Security awareness training must cover all personnel working in the port 
facilities. New methodologies must be developed for the training/refreshment 
training of the basic port security guards for the most effective management 
of the port security duties.  
4. To detect and prevent terrorists using small vessels, non-ISPS small vessels 
security measures must be taken by the public, industry and government 
officials.  
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The following suggestions were developed for the enhanced implementation of the 
ISPS Code to increase the effectiveness of maritime transport system from 
operational level perspective: 
1. All access points (gates) into the port should be strictly controlled and there 
should be a comprehensive policy and specific written procedures which 
define the access of persons (employees, visitors, contractors, truck drivers, 
ship chandlers, etc.), vehicles (employee and visitor cars, trucks, etc.), and 
items (cargo, containers, trailers, ship’s goods, spare parts, etc.) into and out 
of the port.  
2. The ISPS Code must obligate use of technological devices such as CCTV, 
fingerprint, X-ray scan, facial recognition, underwater security devices and 
etc and regulate respective training for the most effective employment of 
these devices. 
3. Some best practice initiatives such as CSI (Container Security Initiative), C-
TPAT (Custom-Trade Partnership against Terrorism) or contracting 
governments own solutions must be taken into account in developing global 
security solutions. 
4. Seaside and under water control must be enhanced with more technological 
devices such as ROV’s or with user divers. 
Finally, in further studies; this study should be repeated at regular intervals in order 
to keep up with solution of the problem and follow the developments related to 
study.  Also, this study should be specified with different ports both in different 
countries also different cities in same countries. Causes that constitute the problem 
should be detailed with more sub-causes. In addition, each cause and their subcauses 
should be addressed in a seperate study. Besides, different methods should be used in 
order to control reability of the study. These studies will enchance the effectiveness 
of the ISPS Code when proposed to international maritime authorities. 
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